Good Governance Curbs Excessive Bank Risks


By Luis Brandão-Marques, Gaston Gelos, and Erik Oppers 

The global financial crisis reminded us that banks often take risks that are excessive from society’s point of view and can damage the economy. In part, this is the result of the incentives embedded in compensation practices and of inadequate monitoring by stakeholders.  Our analysis found the right policies could reduce banks risky behavior. 

Our findings

In our latest Global Financial Stability Report we take stock of recent developments in executive pay, corporate governance, and bank risk taking, and conduct a novel empirical analysis.

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Lost & Found in Eastern Europe: Replacing Funding by Western Europe’s Banks


By Bas Bakker and Christoph Klingen

With Western Europe’s banks under pressure, where does this leave Europe’s emerging economies and their financial systems that are dominated by subsidiaries of these very same banks?  There is little doubt that the era of generous parent-funding for subsidiaries is over.  But parent bank deleveraging—selling off assets, raising capital, and reducing loans, including to their subsidiaries—need not translate into a reduction of bank credit in emerging Europe.

A credit crunch can be avoided as long as parent banks reduce exposures gradually and domestic deposits, other banks, and local financial markets fill the void. Policymakers should create the conditions for this to happen.

The ties that bind

The dependence of the banking systems in emerging Europe on Western European banks is well known:

  • Ownership— foreign banks control more than half of the banking systems in most of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. Their share exceeds 80 percent in Bosnia, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia. Only in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Slovenia, and Turkey do they not dominate.

How Iceland Recovered from its Near-Death Experience


 By Poul M. Thomsen

(Versions in Español and Français)

When I traveled to Reykjavik in October 2008 to offer the IMF’s assistance, the situation there was critical. The country’s three main banks—which made up almost the entire financial system—had just collapsed within a week of each other. The sense of fear and shock were palpable—few, if any, countries had ever experienced such a catastrophic economic crash.

There was a lot of concern that a disorderly depreciation of the exchange rate would be ruinous for households and companies if nothing was done or that deposit runs would cripple what was left of the financial system. The scale of the uncertainty was staggering―the three banks had assets worth more than 1,000 percent of GDP, and no one knew at that point how large the losses would turn out to be and how they would be divided between Icelanders and foreigners.

Today, three years later, it is worth reflecting on how far Iceland―a country of just 320,000 people―has come since those dark days back in 2008. Continue reading

Global Growth Hits a Soft Patch


By Olivier Blanchard

(Versions in
عربي,  中文EspañolFrançaisPortuguêsРусский)

Today we’re in Sao Paulo, Brazil, to release our update to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.

Despite a mild slowdown, the global economic recovery continues but the road to health will be a long one.  Downside risks, both old and new, are increasing.

Our world forecast is 4.3% growth for 2011, and 4.5% for 2012, so down by 0.1% for 2011, and unchanged for 2012, relative to April.  This figure hides very different performances for advanced economies on the one hand, and for emerging and developing economies on the other.  Continue reading

Reducing the Chance of Pulling the Plug on Liquidity


By Jeanne Gobat

The near collapse of the financial system that set off the global crisis was due in part to financial institutions suddenly lacking access to funding markets, and liquidity drying-up across securities markets.

Many financial institutions were unable to roll over or obtain short term funding without sustaining significant losses. This threatened to sink them.

Financial institutions did not factor in how their own responses to a liquidity shortfall could make the entire system shut down and less stable—that is, they underestimated their contribution to systemic liquidity risk in good times, and did not bear the cost of their actions on others in bad times.

It only takes a few institutions to pull the plug on a liquidity-filled bathtub before it runs dry, and the central bank needs to open the spigots again. Continue reading

Observations on the Evolution of Economic Policies


Guest post by Michael Spence, New York University,
Professor Emeritus Stanford University, and
co-host of the Conference on Macro and Growth Policies in the Wake of the Crisis

It was a privilege to participate in the IMF conference devoted to rethinking policy frameworks in the wake of the crisis. Highly encouraging was the openness of the discussion, the range of views, the willingness to question orthodoxy, and the posture of humility.

One gets the impression that the crisis has triggered a response that it should trigger, and we have embarked on a path of rethinking conceptual frameworks and policy choices in a way that will contribute to the stability of the system.

That said, the good news is that we recognize that in finance and parts of macroeconomics the models or frameworks are incomplete. That represents a challenge to the academic community. But it also means that, in the short run, participants and regulators will be operating with incomplete models. This will require judgments (which will be uncomfortable in contrast to the earlier sense of certainty). There will be mistakes. And, as Olivier Blanchard said in his excellent summary, we will proceed step-by-step, evaluating the impacts of policy choices and sometimes reversing course. Continue reading

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